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CHAPTER 2 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.1. Wills: Alteration and effect thereof. An alteration of any 
material part of a will made after execution is ineffective unless it is 
made with the formalities required for the execution of a valid will. 
Although it has been stated that Massachusetts law does not raise a 
presumption as to the time of will changes,l the proponent has the 
burden of proving that they occurred before the instrument was exe-
cuted.2 
In Flynn v. Barrington3 the Supreme Judicial Court from an exami-
nation of the document alone concluded that a will was altered at some 
time. The dispositive provisions were handwritten on a stationer's 
form. In its altered form a legacy of $160,000 was given to testator's 
wife. It appeared that a five-digit sum at least was given to the wife 
and that the figures "0 000" were present at all times, hence the original 
legacy could not have been less than $10,000. The Court remanded 
the case to the Probate Court for further hearing and if the propo-
nents then failed "to establish that the alteration occurred prior to 
execution of the will or the actual amount of the original gift before 
the alteration, the record at the new hearing may be such as to make 
it appropriate to admit the unaltered document to probate, treating 
the gift to the widow as having been in the minimum amount of 
$10,000." 4 
The proffered solution in the event of lack of proof of the time of 
alteration and of the amount of the wife's original legacy in no way 
subverts the policy of the wills act. The unaltered bequest appeared 
in a writing properly attested, and even after the change it appeared 
certain that at least $10,000 was given. The exact amount may have 
been substantially greater, but to require that the gift completely fail 
if there be no proof of that sum would fully defeat the testator's wishes 
to make a pecuniary legacy in favor of his wife. 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§2.1. 1 Wilton v. Humphreys, 176 Mass. 253, 257. 57 N.E. 374. 375 (1900); O'Con-
nell v. Dow. 182 Mass. 541. 552. 66 N.E. 788. 792 (1905). 
2 Hogan v. Whittemore. 278 Mass. 573. 576. 180 N .E. 526, 528 (1932); Wilton v. 
Humphreys, 176 Mass. 255. 257, 57 N.E. 574, 575 (1900). 
3342 Mass. 189, 172 N.E.2d 595 (1961). . 
4342 Mass. at 194, 172 N.E.2d at 596. 
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§2.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 15 
§2.2. Wills: Pour-over: Independent significance. In estate plan-
ning it is often desirable to have separate transfers of property inte-
grated by merging control of administration in a single trust with a 
comprehensive dispositive scheme. A popular device is to bequeath 
property to the trustee of a living trust. This is commonly known 
as a "pour-over" arrangement. There are two theories upon which 
a pour-over from a will to an inter vivos trust may be given effect-
the doCtrine of incorporation by reference and the doctrine of inde-
pendent significance. 
The doctrine of incorporation by reference will permit the will to 
dispose of property according to the terms of an inter vivos trust instrci::~ 
ment if (1) the instrument is in existence at the date of execution of 
the will, (2) the will describes the instrument with reasonable certainty, 
(3) the instrument is described as being in existence when the will is 
executed, (4) the intent of the testator to incorporate the writing ap-
pears in the will.1 
The utilization of this theory to effectuate the pour-over of a residue 
into an inter vivos trust presents distinct disadvantages. With the 
trust writing incorporated into the will, the trustee will become subject 
to probate control in the administration of the assets received by will. 
If the trust is an amendable one, the pour-over will be effective only 
with regard to the trust instrument as it read at the time the will was 
executed, and subsequent amendments will be disregarded insofar as 
the addition of the probate assets is involved.2 It became familiar 
practice for the Massachusetts lawyer, who relied on the theory of in-
corporation, to execute a codicil to the will incorporating each new 
amendment to the trust. This practice is obviously inconvenient and 
subject to risk. 
The more practical way to realize a pour-over into a living trust 
would be to rely upon the so-called doctrine of independent signifi-
cance.a This theory permits resort to unattested acts and facts that 
have a significance apart from the testamentary disposition in deter-
mining who is to take what property under the will. A valid inter 
vivos trust created by the testator, who 'pours the residue of his estate 
into such trust, has an independent significance even though it be 
revocable and amendable.4 The Restatement of Trusts, Second, §54, 
Comment i, recognizes this theory as effectuating a pour-over into an 
amendable trust in the following language: 
§2.2. 1 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935); 
Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91 (1881); Atkinson, Wills §80 (2d ed. 
1953); 2 Page, Wills §§19.17-19.36 (3d ed. 1960). 
2 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N .E. 920 (1935)_ 
a See Restatement of Trusts, Second, §54, Comment i; I Scott, Trusts §54.3 (2d ed. 
1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook §16 2d ed. 1953); McClana-
han, Bequests to an Existing Trust, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 267 (1959); Palmer, Testamen-
tary Disposition to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50 Mich_ L. Rev. 33 (1951); 
Evans, Non-testamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
635 (1949). 
4 See National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944). 
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Where the inter vivos trust is created by an instrument in which 
the settlor has reserved power by subsequent instruments to modify 
the trust, and in his will he leaves property to be added to the 
trust, and thereafter he executes an instrument modifying the 
trust, the disposition made by the will is valid. 
1£ in his will the testator manifested an intention that the prop-
erty bequeathed should be held upon the terms of the trust as they 
were at the time of the execution of the will, the disposition may 
be upheld upon the ground that he has incorporated by reference 
the existing trust instrument. It may also be upheld upon the 
ground that the trust as it was at the time of the execution of the 
will was a fact of independent significance. 
1£ in his will the testator manifested an intention that the prop-
erty bequeathed should be held upon the terms of the trust as they 
should be at the time of his death, the disposition is valid on the 
ground of resorting to a fact of independent significance. It can-
not be supported on the ground of incorporation by reference, 
since the instrument which was to govern the testamentary dis-
position, namely the instrument of modification, was not in exist-
ence at the time of the execution of the will. On the other hand, 
it can be upheld on the ground of resorting to a fact of inde-
pendent significance, since the inter vivos trust, as it exists at the 
time of the settlor's death, is such a fact. It is immaterial that the 
trust was modified after the execution of the will; it is sufficient 
that it exists independently of the testamentary disposition at the 
time of the testator's death. . . . 
The question of how far a pour-over from a will to an amendable 
inter vivos trust established by the testator is valid and enforceable 
had not received a full discussion by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court before the 1961 SURVEY year. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleve-
land Ii was a case containing dictum to the effect that a pour-over would 
be valid only if the requirements for an incorporation by reference were 
met. After the Court found that a will gave the residue to the trustee 
of an amendable trust in its unamended form, the Court volunteered 
the information that the testator could not pass property to the trust as 
amended if the amendment were made after execution of the will.6 
This dictum was rejected and the doctrine of independent signifi-
cance was fully accepted and applied in Second Bank-State Street Trust 
Co. v. Pinion.7 There, a husband and wife established a revocable 
and amendable inter vivos trust which provided for amendment by a 
Ii 291 Mass. !lBO, 196 N .E. 920 (19!15). 
6 "Obviously the will did not, and could not, give the residue in trust for purposes 
which had not then been defined, but remained to be defined by a later amendment 
of the trust deed. A document not in existence cannot be covered by the attesta-
tion of the will. . ., Even though the testator so expected, the residue passing by 
the will cannot simply be added to the trust fund established during the life of 
[the testator], and be made to follow the course of that fund to its ultimate destina-
tion under the amended trust deed." 291 Mass. at 380, 196 N.E. at 921. 
7!141 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960). 
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written instrument signed and acknowledged by the settlors and the 
two trustees, one of whom was the husband. Later, they executed 
separate wills which bequeathed the residue of their estates to the 
previously created trust "as amended." Both wills provided that the 
residuary estates paid to the trustees were "to be held, administered, 
and distributed solely under the provisions of such indenture, and in 
no way as trustee under this will nor as a trustee subject to appoint-
ment by or jurisdiction of any probate or other court." After the 
execution of these wills, the husband and wife, as settlors, and the 
husband, as one of the trustees, executed an instrument amending 
the dispositive provisions of the trust. On this same day they executed 
codicils to their wills to name a co-executor and to ratify and confirm 
the will in all other respects. Four days after execution of the codicils 
the amendment to the trust became effective when it was acknowledged 
by the second trustee. After the deaths of the husband and wife, the 
executor sought instructions as to the mode of disposition of both 
residuary estates. 
The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that each will made effective 
residual gifts to trustees to hold under the trust as amended. The 
doctrine of incorporation by reference was deemed inapplicable be-
cause the wills expressly negatived any intent to incorporate the trust 
into the wills - the residuary clauses provided that the trustees were 
not to be subject to the control of the probate court and that the trust 
funds were to be administered and distributed solely under the terms 
of the trust indenture. Furthermore, the instrument of amendment 
did not become effective until after the second trustee acknowledged 
it, and this did not happen until after the codicils were executed. 
In concluding that the pour-over into the trust as an entity was valid, 
the Court noted that this was the logical extension of several previously 
decided Massachusetts cases which permitted testamentary dispositions 
to be controlled by acts of nontestamentary significance.s 
Apart from legislation,9 the Pinion case is the first in any jurisdiction 
expressly deciding that a will may pass the residue to an amended trust 
when the amendment was with respect to a dispositive provision and 
.. when it was made after the execution of the will.1o 
SA bequest to persons in the employ of the testator at his death: Anderson v. 
Stone, 281 Mass. 458, 1811 N.E. 841 (191111); Murphy v. Lawrence, 218 Mass. 119, 105 
N.E. 1180 (1914); Frazer v. Weld, 177 Mass. 5111, 59 N.E. 118 (1901); White v. Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, 17l Mass. 84, 87, 50 N.E. 512, 514 (1898). A bequest 
of contents of a safe: Old Colony Trust Co. v. Hale, 1102 Mass. 68, 71, 18 N.E. 4112, 
4!!4 (19118); Gaff v. Cornwallis, 219 Mass. 226, 106 N.E. 860 (1914). The contents of 
books of account controlled the amount of a bequest even though the books were not 
in existence when the will was made: Holmes v. Coates, 159 Mass. 226, 228-229, 114 
N.E. 190 (18911). See also Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (19110). 
9 See statutes cited by the Court, 1141 Mass. 1166, 1171 n.l, 170 N.E.2d 1150, 115!! n.l 
{1960). 
10 See In re Estate of York, 95 N.H. 4!!5, 65 A.2d 282 (1949) (no subsequent amend-
ment and doctrine of independent significance applied); Swetland v. Swetland, 102 
N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928) (no subsequent amendment and gift to trustee 
treated as a gift to an entity); In re Ivie's Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1956) 
(amendment as to administrative provision after execution of will). 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/5
18 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §2.3 
§2.3. Wills: Apportionment of estate tax. If a decedent fails to 
specify where the burden of the federal estate tax will fall, the state 
tax apportionment law controls. A Massachusetts statute1 imposes 
upon a nonprobate item which is included in the gross estate that 
portion of the estate tax that is attributable to such item. Property 
subject to a general power of appointment will bear its share of the 
tax, "except as otherwise provided or directed by the trust instrument 
... or by the decedent's will." 2 
Whitbeck v. Aldrich3 decided that the effect of a tax clause in testa-
trix' will was to impose upon her probate estate all death taxes on 
items in her gross estate including property subject to a power of ap· 
pointment, leaving insufficient funds to satisfy the bequests under her 
will. Her will exercised a general power of appointment, made pro-
vision for a specific devise, two pecuniary legacies in the approximate 
amount of $23,000, and left the balance of the estate in trust for an 
invalid sister. The tax clause read: 
All estate, inheritance, legacy, succession or transfer taxes ... 
imposed by any domestic or foreign laws now or hereafter in force 
with respect to all property taxable under such laws by reason of 
my death whether or not such property passes under this will and 
whether such taxes be payable by my estate or by any recipient of 
any such property, shall be paid by my executor out of my general 
estate ... with no right of reimbursement from any recipient of 
any such property. 
The federal estate tax on the gross estate approximated $40,000, but 
so much of the tax that was attributable to the decedent's individually 
owned estate exclusive of the subject matter of the power amounted to 
less than $200. 
The Court thought that the will expressly and clearly provided for 
a tax apportionment other than that provided for by statute even 
though the payment of the larger tax out of the estate of the testatrix 
left insufficient funds to pay the two pecuniary legacies in full and no 
funds for the trust for the benefit of the invalid sister. In answer to 
the contention that the decedent could not have intended such a result, 
the Court stated that there was no ambiguity in the will and that it 
was not to guess the intention of the testatrix from what would seem 
to be a more equitable testamentary scheme. It is possible that she 
would have specifically desired the result which has happened. 
The case is distinguishable from Malden Trust Co. v. Bickford,4 
where a will provided: 
I direct that all taxes of every kind upon the whole or any part 
of my estate, including inheritance, estate and transfer taxes, both 
§2.!I. 1 G.L., c. 65A, §5. 
2 Id. §5(2). 
s !l41 Mass. !l26, 169 N.E.2d 882 (1960). 
4329 Mass. 567,109 N.E.2d 45!1 (1952). 
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state and federal, shall be paid from the residue of my estate, it 
being my desire that the legatees and devisee herein shall receive 
the full amount of their legacies and devise without the deduction 
of any tax. 
It was held that the words "my estate" meant probate estate and that 
joint accounts and bank shares in the gross estate bore a proportionate 
burden of the federal estate tax. It was recognized that the words "my 
estate" could have been construed to mean taxable estate but for the 
qualifying words, "it being my desire that the legatees and devisee 
herein shall receive the full amount of their legacies and devise with-
out the deduction of any tax.'" I> The tax clause in the Whitbeck case 
refers to "all property taxable under such laws by reason of my death 
whether or not such property passes under this will," which language 
appears to preclude an interpretation that decedent had in mind her 
probate estate only. 
§2.4. Wills: Conservator's waiver approved after death of ward. 
By statute the guardian or conservator of a surviving spouse may with 
the approval of the Probate Court exercise the ward's right to waive 
the will and claim a statutory forced share.1 Although the waiver must 
be filed within six months of the date of allowance of the will,2 the 
approval of the court does not have to be given within that time.3 
It was decided in Old Colony Trust Co. v. CofJman4 that the Probate 
Court had jurisdiction to approve a conservator's waiver filed within 
six months of the probate of the decedent spouse's will despite the 
ward's death before the approval. On waiver the ward obtained a 
vested interest which passed to his personal representative upon his 
death. The statute requiring approval of the waiver was not designed 
to affect that interest but was intended to forestall waivers filed in bad 
faith or to the disadvantage of the ward.1> 
It was not considered significant that the duties of the conservator 
ended with the death of the ward except for the winding up of the 
estate. It was observed that the Probate Court's jurisdiction over the 
ward's estate continued and that it was bound to see that the estate, 
including the forced share derived from the wife, was properly admin-
istered. 
§2.5. Probate decree: Petition to vacate. The Probate Court has 
extensive powers to vacate decrees upon the grounds of fraud, mistake, 
lack of jurisdiction, or for' new evidence which first became known 
II 529 Mass. at 568, 109 N.E.2d at 454. Compare Martin v. New England Dea· 
coness Hospital, 328 Mass. 259, 103 N.E.2d 240 (1952). 
§2.4. 1 C.L., c. 201, §§20, 45. 
2 Id. §15. 
3 Miller v. Miller, 539 Mass. 262, 158 N.E.2d 674 (1959); Essex Trust Co. v. Averill, 
321 Mass. 68, 70-71, 71 N.E.2d 767 (1947). 
4342 Mass. 153, 172 N.E.2d 609 (1961). 
II See Hanchett v_ Hill, 316 Mass. 613, 676, 56 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1944); Dolbeare v. 
Bowser, 254 Mass. 57,149 N.E. 626 (1925). 
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after the decree was entered.1 In the recent case of Agricultural 
National Bank of Pittsfield v. Bernard,2 the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a petition to vacate should have been entertained on newly 
discovered evidence that the will allowed was revoked by a later will 
duly executed, although there was no proof available as to the contents 
of the later instrument other than the presence of a clause revoking all 
prior wills. However, in Boxill v. Maloney} decided during the 1961 
SURVEY year, the Court upset a decree vacating the allowance of a will 
alleged to have been revoked by marriage subsequent to its execution. 
There, the testatrix gave birth to a son while she was unmarried. 
Subsequently, in 1928, she executed a will leaving all her property "to 
my husband, Lewis A. Cave" and nominated "my said husband" as 
executor. She died in 1946, and the son entered an appearance in 
opposition to the allowance of the will and also filed a petition for 
administration. After having consulted with counsel and having been 
paid $1500 from his mother's estate, the son gave written consent to the 
allowance of the will, and the will was then allowed in 1947. 
In 1960 the son brought a petition to vacate the decree allowing the 
will, contending that the will had been revoked; that, although his 
mother and Cave lived together as husband and wife from 1911 to 
1940, they were not married until 1940 when they had a ceremonial 
marriage, and this marriage revoked the will. 
The Court reversed the granting of the petition, observing that there 
was no fraud, mistake of fact, or any basis in the record for any con-
clusion that the revocation of the decree was appropriate to afford the 
petitioner an opportunity to present a meritorious case which in 1947 
he had no opportunity to present. Nor was it thought necessary to 
decide whether the testatrix and Cave were married at the time of exe-
cution of the will or whether the will was in contemplation of mar-
riage.4 The Court felt that there was a reasonable basis for the 1947 
decree and by exercise pf due diligence the issues could have been 
presented at that time}1 
The case is unlike the Bernard case in that the information as to the 
facts that might have led to the conclusion that the wiIl was revoked 
was available and could have been presented at the time of the pro-
ceedings that resulted in the decree. In Boxill the issues were com-
promised by the parties before the entry of the decree of allowance. 
§2.6. Widow's allowance: Amount. The very nature of the widow's 
§2.5. 1 See Agricultural National Bank of Pittsfield v. Bernard, 338 Mass. 54, 
153 N.E.2d 761 (1958); Reynolds v. Remick, 333 Mass. 1, 127 N.E.2d 653 (1955); Ken-
nedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 431, 32 N.E.2d 215 (1941); Lowell v. Lowell, 276 Mass. 
10, 176 N.E. 210 (1931). See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.2; 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §12.2. 
2338 Mass. 54, 153 N.E.2d 761 (1958), 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.2. 
S 342 Mass. 399, 173 N.E.2d 283 (1961). 
4 See G.L., c. 191, §9; Hertrais v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E.2d 909 (1949). 
1\ It might have been decided that the son was estopped to seek a revocation of 
the decree because of his consent to the decree and his waiver of appeal, but the 
Court thought that it was /l matter it did not have to decide. 342 Mass. 399, 401, 
173 N.E.2d 283, 284 (1961). 
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allowance leaves a wide field for the exercise of judicial discretion. l 
The amount of the allowance cannot, however, exceed that which is 
required to provide for the necessities of the widow until she has an 
opportunity to adjust to the new situation that has resulted from the 
death of her husband.2 It has been emphasized that the award is de-
signed to provide for temporary relief only.3 
Townsend v. Wood 4 held that a $15,000 widow's allowance was an 
award either for necessaries for more than a short time or for more 
than necessaries and hence excessive. The estate consisted of $250,000 
in personalty and $28,500 in realty. During his lifetime the deceased 
had been living on approximately $1500 a month including the em-
ployment of a maid and a gardening service. The widow was seventy 
years of age with a meager income. 
If the award were upheld, the surviving spouse would have received 
approximately 6 percent of the inventoried estate free of any income 
tax.!1 Such an amount would have been above that required for actual 
necessities for a temporary period. 
§2.7. Widow's allowance: Estate tax marital deduction. During 
the 1961 SURVEY year the Tax Court of the United States decided in 
Rudnick v. Gommissioner of Internal Revenuel that the Massachusetts 
widow's allowance qualified for the federal estate tax marital deduc-
tion. A Massachusetts resident died intestate survived by a widow and 
two minor daughters. The Probate Court allowed the widow a lump 
sum of $10,000 "as necessaries for herself and family under her care, 
in addition to the provisions and other articles by law belonging to 
her." This sum was paid and none of it was ever returned despite the 
remarriage of the widow. The award was shown in all of the intestate's 
estate accountings which were approved by the Probate Court. 
The $10,000 was claimed as part of the marital deduction2 in the 
estate tax return. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed 
$6666.66 3 of the deduction on the ground that the award was a termi-
§2.6. 1 General Laws, c. 196, §2, provides in part: "Such parts of the personal 
property of a deceased person as the probate court, having regard to ~ll the circum-
stances of the case, may allow as necessaries to his widow for herself and for his 
family under her care, . . . and the use of the house of the deceased and of the 
furniture therein for six months next succeeding his or her death, shall not be taken 
as assets for the payment of debts, legacies or charges of administration." 
2 Hooker v. Porter, 273 Mass. 316, 319, 173 N.E. 588, 590 (1930); Glover v. Glover, 
215 Mass. 576, 577, 102 N.E. 945, 946 (1913); Dale v. Hanover National Bank, 155 
Mass. 141, 144, 29 N.E. 371, 372 (1891); Washburn v. Washburn, 10 Pick. 374, 375 
(Mass. 1830). 
3 Patterson v. Fine, 287 Mass. 268, 271-272, 191 N.E. 643, 644 (1934); Hooker v. 
Porter,273 Mass. 316, 318, 173 N.E. 588,589 (1930); Glover v. Glover, 215 Mass. 576, 
577, 102 N.E. 945, 946 (1913). 
4342 Mass. 481, 174 N:E.2d 420 (1961). 
II See G.L., c. 62; 26 U.S.C. §§661·662 (1958); Treas. Reg. §1.661(a)-2(e). 
§2.7. 1 36 T.C. No. 105 (1961). 
226 U.S.C. §2056 (1958). 
8 The Commissioner allowed one third apparently because the widow was entitled 
to this fraction as a statutory heir and the award was treated as an advancement of 
her heir's interest. 
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nable interest4 under Massachusetts law: that the widow's allowance 
would tenninate upon her death and, since the award had been 
granted to her and the minor daughters in a lump sum, the amount 
attributable to her alone was not ascertainable and would be payable 
to the daughters upon her death. 
The Tax Court disagreed with the Commissioner, found that the 
$10,000 award was not a tenninable interest, and allowed that entire 
amount in computation of the marital deduction. It observed that 
the widow's allowance took precedence over debts and expenses;1i that 
the award might be proper even though the estate were solvent;6 
that once the allowance is granted, it is not subject to collateral attack 
but can be set aside only on direct appeal;? and that the Probate Court 
itself could not reduce an allowance in a later state of the probate pro-
ceedings if the award were not appealed.s The court also stated that 
there was nothing in the Massachusetts statutes that would lead to the 
conclusion that a widow's award once decreed would pass to anyone 
else in the event of her death or remarriage.9 
Although a widow's allowance will fail if she dies before a decree 
awarding it to her becomes final,lo it does not become a tenninable 
interest under the Internal Revenue Code.ll The award in Rudnick 
was final and approved by the Probate Court in the administratrix' 
accounts even though it was apparent on the face of these accounts that 
the widow had remarried. 
426 U.S.C. §2056(b) (1958) provides: "Limitation in the Case of Life Estate or 
Other Terminable Interest.-
"(I) General Rule. - Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event 
or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest 
passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed 
under this section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent 
to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); 
and 
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may 
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of 
the interest so passing to the surviving spouse; . . ." 
II Glover v. Glover, 215 Mass. 576, 102 N.E. 945 (1913). 
6 Dale v. Hanover National Bank. 155 Mass. 141,29 N.E. 371 (1891). 
7 Vaughan v. Smith, 335 Mass. 418, 140 N.E.2d 195 (1957), 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §12.2. 
S Pettee v. Wilmarth, 87 Mass. 144 (1862). 
9 General Laws, c. 196, §2, provides: "Such parts of the personal property of a 
deceased person as the probate court, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case, may allow as necessaries to his widow for herself and for his family under her 
care, or if there is no widow or if the deceased was a woman, to the minor children 
of the deceased, not exceeding one hundred dollars to any child, and also such pro-
visions and other articles as are necessary for the reasonable sustenance of his 
family, if the deceased was a man, or of her minor children, if the deceased was a 
woman, and the use of the house of the deceased and of the furniture therein for six 
months next succeeding his or her death, shall not be taken as assets for the pay-
ment of debts, legacies or charges of administration. . • ." 
10 Adams v. Adams, 51 Mass. 170(1845). 
11 See Estate of Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960). 
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fell short of giving s\offjcient assistance)o ascertain the testatrix' in-
terest, the Court feltG<tmpelled to rely on rules of construction. De-
spite the fact that the trust was to be administered in Massachusetts 
by a local trustee, Maryland law was applied because the case was con-
cerned with the meaning of ' dispositive provisions of a testamentary 
trust of a Maryland domiciliary and not with matters relating to its 
administration.2 Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court, relying on 
a Maryland canon of construction,S found for those persons who an-
swered the description of "heirs at law" of the testatrix at the death of 
the last surviving daughter. 
There was also an observation that if Massachusetts law controlled 
then "heirs at law" would mean heirs determined at the death of the 
testatrix.4 The remainder over to the heirs of the testatrix would be 
treated as though it expressed the desire that the statute of descent and 
distribution was to determine the takers if all the earlier dispositions 
should fai1.5 
The date of ascertainment of a testator's heirs was also in issue in 
the case of Dodson v. Winn.6 The decedent's will left real estate in 
trust for the benefit of his son, who was also the testator's sole heir at 
law. The trustee was given the power "to mortgage, lease and convey 
the same to any person or persons when requested in writing by, or by 
the will of [the son], and to distribute the net proceeds thereof, if any, 
to [the son] as he shall direct." There was no residuary clause. The 
son died intestate, without issue and without having exercised his 
power of appointment. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the testator died intestate as 
to the reversion of the real estate. Since the son was the only heir, he 
held the reversion subject to defeasance by exercise of the power of 
appointment. When the son died, the reversion descended to his wife 
as his statutory heir, but whether she took all or only one half of the 
real estate would depend on the net worth of his estate.7 
It appeared, therefore, that the son had the full beneficial title to 
the real estate at the date of testator's death, and the power to dispose 
of the property during life and by will was redundant. If the testator's 
will gave property to his son for life together with a general power to 
appoint the remainder followed by an express gift over to the testator's 
2 See New England Trust Co. v. Wood, 326 Mass. 239, 242-243, 93 N.E.2d 547, 549 
(1950); Phelps v. Mattoon, 310 Mass. 97, 99-100, 37 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1941). 
For further discussion of this problem see the chapter on conflict of laws, §8.2 
intra. 
S "Where there is an ultimate limitation upon a contingency to a class of persons 
plainly described, and there are persons answering the description in esse when 
the contingency happens, they alone can take." Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175, 191, 17 
Atl. 1014, 1016 (1889). 
4 See New England Trust Co. v. Watson, 330 Mass. 265, 265-266, 112 N.E.2d 799, 
800 (1953); Tyler v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 314 Mass. 528, 531, 50 N.E.2d 
778,780 (1943). See also 3 Restatement of Property §308; 2 Simes and Smith, Future 
Interests §734 (2d ed. 1956). 
51961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 883, 886,174 N.E.2d 763, 765. 
6341 Mass. 345, 169 N.E.2d 898 (1960). 
7 See G.L., c. 190, §2, as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 316, §2. 
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The Commissioner contended that since t~e amount paid to the 
decedent's widow was also for the benefit of tie minor children, the 
interest of the widow was not allocated and therefore unascertainable, 
thereby making the allowance a terminable interest. This contention 
was rejected on the ground that neither the Massachusetts statute nor 
the court decree gave the minor children any rights in the award either 
during the widow's lifetime or after her death. The court pointed out 
that a minor's right to support by his mother after his father's death is 
a right granted by law and is not an interest passing to him from his 
father's estate. 
§2.8. Heirs at law: When ascertained. In Second Bank-State Street 
Trust Co. v. Weston1 a testatrix died domiciled in Maryland. Her will 
left the residue of her estate to a Massachusetts trustee to pay the in-
come to her daughters, as long as they lived, in equal shares. If any 
daughter died leaving issue, then such issue were to take the daughter's 
share. In the event of a daughter's death without issue, the share of 
the income of the deceased daughter was to be divided among her sur-
viving sisters. Upon the death of the last surviving daughter, the 
principal was to be divided among their issue per stirpes. If all of the 
daughters died leaving no issue surviving them, the trust fund less 
certain pecuniary gifts "shall go to my heirs at law." She also au-
thorized the trustee to advance to a child or grandchild of the testatrix 
a portion of the principal, "but no advancement . . . shall exceed one 
half of the value of the then expectant or presumptive or vested share 
of such child or grandchild." 
When all the daughters died leaving no issue, a successor trustee 
sought instructions as to the meaning of "heirs at law" - whether the 
heirs were to be determined at the death of testatrix, i.e., her daughters, 
or whether the heirs were to be ascertained at the date of death of her 
last surviving daughter, i.e., certain descendants of the parents of the 
testatrix. 
The Supreme Judicial Court could find no indication of the meaning 
of heirs at law without relying upon a rule of construction. One of the 
contentions favoring the claim that the daughters took as "heirs at law" 
was that the provision for advancements up to one half of the expectant 
or presumptive or vested share would have little meaning unless the 
daughter as an "heir at law" could take a share of the principal by way 
of a remainder. The Court, however, felt that the provision was of 
slight assistance. It could be interpreted as permitting an advance to 
a daughter up to one half of the share of the corpus from which she 
may have been receiving the income. It could mean that a daughter 
was to take one half of the principal as an heir at law by way of a con-
tingent remainder. Or, the Court thought it plausible that the use of 
the words "expectant or presumptive" in the provision had to do with 
the possibility that a daughter of the testatrix might die leaving issue 
surviving her before the death of the last surviving daughter. 
Since the language of the will and all the surrounding circumstances 
§2.8. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 883, 174 N.E.2d 763. 
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heirs, the heirs should be determined as of the date of the son's death 
if the son were testator's sole heir. There would be an apparent in-
congruity if the son were to have more than a life estate.8 Furthermore, 
it would make the power to appoint redundant if the son had both the 
life estate and the vested remainder in fee simple, the power to dispose 
of the property being an incident to ownership of a vested remainder.9 
In the Dodson case, however, the will did not expressly limit the 
remainder over to anyone. Thus the remainder had to pass as intestate 
property to the testator's son as his only heir under the statute of 
descent. 
§2.9. Resulting trust: Husband and wife: Tenancy by the entirety. 
When a person pays the purchase price for real property and takes 
title in the name of another, in the absence of an indication of an 
intent to the contrary, a purchase money resulting trust arises in favor 
of the one who furnishes the consideration. But, if the transferee is 
the wife of the one paying the purchase price, a presumption of gift 
arises and no resulting trust comes into existence unless the presump-
tion is rebutted.1 
In Goldman. v. Finkel2 the Supreme Judicial Court reversed a Pro-
bate Court's decree that a husband was the sole owner of property in 
the names of husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.3 The lower 
8 See 3 Restatement of Property §308, Comment k, which provides: "If a person 
to whom a prior interest in the subject matter of the conveyance has been given 
is the sole heir of the designated ancestor at the death of such ancestor, there is 
some incongruity in also giving such person all the interest under the limitation to 
'heirs' or 'next of kin.' The incongruity is especially great when a will conveys 
property 'to B and his heirs but if B dies without issue to my heirs' and B is the 
sole heir of A. The incongruity is almost as great when A, by will, conveys property 
'to B for life then to my heirs' and B is the sole heir of A. Thus, the fact that in 
such cases, B is the sole heir of A at the death of A tends to establish that A in-
tended his heirs to be ascertained as of the death of B, so that B is prevented from 
sharing in the limitation to the heirs of A." See also 2 Simes and Smith, Future 
Interests §735 (2d ed. 1956); Annotation, 30 A.L.R.2d 393 (1953). But see Gilman v. 
Congregational Home Missionary Society, 276 Mass. 580, 177 N.E. 621 (1931). 
9 See Warren v. Sears, 303 Mass. 578, 22 N.E.2d 406 (1939); but compare Gilman v. 
Congregational Home Missionary Society, 276 Mass. 580, 177 N.E. 621 (1931), where 
testator's daughter was his sole heir and his will left the residue to his daughter "for 
and during the term of her natural life only" to apply the income for her support 
and maintenance with "full power and authority [in her] to apply the whole or any 
part of the principal for the same purposes . .." On her death the residue was to 
go to her issue then living, and if she died leaving no issue then to her present hus-
band for life and at his death or at the death of the daughter, if she survived her 
husband and died without issue, "then in such case ... the residue is to go to my 
heirs at law." The Court held that the daughter took under the designation of 
"heirs-at-Iaw." If followed the ordinary rule that "[a] testator usually resorts to the 
word 'heirs' to express the objects of his bounty after having exhausted his specific 
wishes and is content otherwise to let the law take its course." 276 Mass. at 583, 
177 N .E. at 622. 
§2.9. 1 McPherson v. McPherson, 337 Mass. 611,613, 150 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1958); 
Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 61, 22 N.E.2d 622, 626 (1939). 
2341 Mass. 492, 170 N .E.2d 474 (1960). 
3 The parties were divorced at the time the action commenced, and the wife 
claimed a one·half undivided interest as a tenant in common. See Bernatavicius v. 
Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N .E. 685 (1927). 
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court concluded that there was a resulting trust after having found that 
the purchase money was furnished entirely by the husband; that title 
was taken in the form of a tenancy by the entirety "for the sole purpose 
of providing that in the event of death of the [husband] the said real 
estate become the property of the [wife] without the necessity of pro-
bating the estate of the [husband] and for the purpose of avoiding 
delay and expenses"; and that since purchase the husband had made 
all payments due in connection with the property including payments 
of principal and interest on first and second mortgages. 
There was nothing in the findings of the probate judge that would 
rebut the presumption that a gift was intended. The husband in-
tended the very consequences that attach to a tenancy by the entirety 
- the passing of the property to the wife by survivorship without the 
necessity of probate. The observation was also made that in all likeli-
hood the wife obligated herself to repay the mortgage loan to the same 
extent as the husband. If this were so, the husband did not furnish all 
of the purchase money, since payments subsequent to taking title can-
not create a resulting trust.4 
§2.10. Trusts: Trust company's qualification to act. New England 
Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Centenary Methodist Church1 
decided that a Massachusetts trust company, duly appointed as a testa-
mentary trustee, which later converts into a national bank and con-
solidates, may continue to act as trustee. The trustee's corporate 
existence continues in the consolidated bank. 
Earlier cases requiring a more restrictive view of the continued iden-
tity of corporate fiduciaries were rejected. In the first of these, Com-
monwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, Petitioner,2 a Massachu-
setts trust company had been nominated executor in a will. The trust 
company converted into a national bank and then consolidated with 
another national bank before the will was offered for probate. It was 
held that the new bank was not entitled to appointment as personal 
representative of the testator. Although the new bank succeeded to 
the old one and continued its business activities, it was not the same 
fiduciary named in the will. It was emphasized that the petitioning 
bank was organized under the laws of a different jurisdiction from that 
of the nominated trustee, that it was controlled by different laws, and 
that it owed allegiance to a different sovereignty. 
The second case was Atlantic National Bank of Boston, Petitioner,S 
where a trust company had been appointed conservator and trustee 
under a will. It later converted into a national bank and consolidated 
with another national bank. The Court held that the new bank was 
not entitled to account as a duly appointed fiduciary, but could account 
only de son tort. The Probate Court did not make a new appointment 
of the consoIiated bank. 
4 Charest v. St. Onge, 1I112 Mass. 628, 6110·6111, 127 N.E.2d 175, 177 (1955). 
§2.l0. 1342 Mass. 1I60. 1711 N.E.2d 294 (1961). 
2249 Mass. 440, 144 N.E. 4411 (1924). 
3261 Mass. 217,158 N.E. 780 (1927). 
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Worcester County National Bank, Petitioner,4 held that a national 
bank, which had been duly appointed administrator and had later con-
solidated with a Massachusetts trust company under the national 
bank's charter, could continue to act as administrator under its new 
name. Unlike Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston and 
Atlantic National Bank of Boston, there was no conversion of the cor-
porate fiduciary into a national bank. However, in Worcester County 
National Bank, Petitioner/' having to do with the same consolidation, 
it was decided that the consolidated bank was not entitled to account 
as executor when the trust company had been previously appointed as 
such by the Probate Court. It was pointed out that an appointment 
as a fiduciary creates a highly personal relationship and is not a prop-
erty right involving a pecuniary interest on the part of the fiduciary. 
Referring to the federal statute authorizing consolidation and provid-
ing for its effect,6 the Court stated: 
To treat the national banking association into which the State 
trust company has been consolidated as preserving the identity of 
the trust company in this particular would be contrary to the 
juridical conception and practice touching the appointment of 
such fiduciaries under the law of this Commonwealth.7 
The New England Merchants National Bank of Boston case expressly 
declared that the restrictions on continuing identity contained in the 
aforementioned cases were no longer applicable. The Court said: 
Whatever formerly may have been substantial grounds of dis-
tinction between national banks and State banks no longer can 
be said to obtain. One surely could not successfully contend that 
Federal bank regulation is less secure than State bank regulation. 
. .. A requirement of new judicial appointments would impose 
upon estates an expense incommensurate with any supposed ad-
vantage. In cases of a trustee under a written instrument such a 
requirement perhaps could necessitate a submission of the trust to 
a court for the first time. . .. While cases may be imagined 
where the successor bank might not be a suitable fiduciary, ade-
4263 Mass. 394, 161 N .E. 797 (1928). . 
II 263 Mass. 444, 162 N.E. 217 (1928), aU'd sub nom. Ex parte Worcester County 
National Bank, 279 U.S. 347,49 Sup. Ct. 368, 73 L. Ed. 7311 (1929). 
61t is provided by 44 Stat. 1226, §3, added by c. 191, approved February 25, 1927, 
in part, that "all the rights, franchises and interests of said State or District bank 
so consolidated with a national banking association in and to every species of prop-
erty, real, personal, and mixed, and choses in action thereto belonging, shall be 
deemed to be transferred to and vested in such national banking association into 
which it is consolidated without any deed or other transfer, and the said consolidated 
national banking association shall hold and enjoy the same and all rights of property, 
franchises and interests, including the right of succession as trustee, executor, or in 
any other fiduciary capacity in the same manner and to the same extent as was 
held and enjoyed by such State or District Bank so consolidated with such national 
banking association." 
7263 Mass. 444, 453·454,162 N.E. 217, 222 (1928). 
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quate protection exists in the power of removal. . .. In general, 
one would not expect that a judicial determination as to the fitness 
of a national bank made as an incident to the approval of an ap-
pointment by a court be even remotely comparable with the thor-
oughness and efficiency of consecutive Federal administrative 
supervision.8 
Massachusetts law on this point now corresponds to the prevailing 
view, although, unlike most states, the result evolved through case law 
rather than legislation.9 
§2.11. New legislation. Chapter 253 of the Acts of 1961 makes 
clarifying changes in the simultaneous death law1 by specifically pro-
viding that: 
[i]f property is so disposed of that the right of a beneficiary to 
succeed to any interest therein is conditional upon his surviving 
another person and both persons die, and there is no sufficient 
evidence that the two have died other than simultaneously, the 
beneficiary shall be deemed not to have survived. 
It also exempts from the application of the simultaneous death statute 
any situation in which provision has been made for a different dis-
tribution of property or for a different presumption of survivorship. 
Acts of 1961, c. 254, amends G.L., c. 206, §24, by adding: 
In cases where the Veterans Administration is entitled to notice 
and the accountant certifies that the value of the estate does not 
exceed five thousand dollars, the Veterans Administration shall 
be deemed a competent disinterested party to represent persons 
unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent to act in their own 
behalf. 
Chapter 271 of the Acts of 1961 permits a federal savings and loan 
association or a national banking association having a savings account 
in trust for another to make payments to the trustee or the other person 
if no other notice of the existence and terms of the trust has been re-
ceived in writing. This corresponds to a similar provision concerning 
Massachusetts savings banks in G.L., c. 168, §21. 
Acts of 1961, c. 448, deletes the last two sentences of G.L., c. 184A, 
§3,2 so as to limit the duration of a possibility of reverter, a right of 
8 S42 Mass. S60. S66-S67. 1711 N.E.2d 294. 298 (1961). 
9 See I Scott, Trusts §96.7 (2d ed. 1956). 
§2.11. 1 G.L., c. 190A. 
2 General Laws. c. 184A. §S. as added by Acts of 1954, c. 641. §I, provided: "A 
fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land subject to a right of entry 
for condition broken shall become a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency 
does not occur within thirty years from the date when such fee simple determinable 
or such fee simple subject to a right of entry becomes possessory. If such contin-
gency occurs within said thirty years the succeeding interest, which may be an in-
terest in a person other than the person creating the interest or his heirs, shall be-
come possessory or the right of entry exercisable notwithstanding the rule against 
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entry, and an executory interest to a period of thirty years when such 
interests arise out of a transfer of land which created a fee simple 
determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. It no 
longer makes a difference that the specified contingency mayor may 
not occur within the period of the rule against perpetuities. The ex-
ceptions involving transfers for charitable purposes and transfers by 
the Commonwealth are also deleted. 
perpetuities. But if a fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land sub-
ject to a right of entry for condition broken is so limited that the specified con-
tingency must occur, if at all, within the period of the rule against perpetuities said 
interests shall take effect as limited. This section shall not apply where both such 
fee simple determinable and such succeeding interest, or both such fee simple and 
such right of entry are for public, charitable, or religious purposes; nor shall it 
apply to a deed, gift or grant of the commonwealth or any political subdivision 
thereof." 
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